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Abstract 
We  examine  two  different  models  of  manufacturer-retailer  successive 
monopoly with retail demand uncertainty.  In the first, both manufacturer and 
retailer are symmetrically uninformed about demand.  An equilibrium exists if 
and only if the marginal costs of production and storage are sufficiently high, 
in  which case the manufacturer offers a full-returns policy.  Together with 
previous results, this shows that both the structure of the uncertainty and the 
timing of  its resolution are  critical  factors affecting the  scope for returns 
policies.  In  the  second model, the manufacturer knows demand while the 
retailer  does  not.  A  full-returns  policy  is  never  offered  in  this  case. 
Moreover, if any partial-returns policy is offered, it does not serve to signal 
the level of demand. 
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Supplier-distributor contracts must assign financial responsibility for unsold goods. In 
some industries manufacturers allow their distributors to return and obtain a full refund 
on unsold stock -  this is known as a consignment contract.  Such 'returns' policies are 
found in book, magazine, and newspaper publishing, as well as music recording, jewelry, 
and cigarettes.'  In the computer distribution and reselling industry, where there is 
significant risk that stocks will become obsolete due to rapid technological innovation, 
ofien manufacturers offer a partial refund on unsold stock. Such practices have been the 
subject of a number of analyses attempting to identifl conditions under which they are 
profitable for the manufacturer 
While some have focused on the insurance benefits that returns policies offer retailers 
when there is demand uncertainty (Marvel and Peck, 1992; Lin, 1993), others have 
shown that returns policies give a manufacturer a strategic advantage by encouraging 
retailers to carry more stock (Pasternack, 1985; Pellegrini, 1986). Kandel (1996) 
canvases a range of possible motivations, showing formally that under successive 
monopoly and retail demand uncertainty that a full-returns policy -  a refund equal to the 
input price paid by the retailer -  is optimal for the manufacturer.  Lastly, Padrnanabhan 
and Png (1997) show that a returns policy can also provide the manufacturer with a 
strategic benefit when there is retail competition, even in the absence of demand 
uncertainty.  It induces more competitive behavior from the retailers, thus encouraging 
them to carry more stock. 
Because of the diverse approaches that have been adopted in studying this topic, no 
clear picture has yet emerged of the relative significance of the various explanations 
above. Achieving such an understanding will likely require, in addition to empirical 
evidence, further theoretical analysis in order to establish the robustness of the above 
results.  This paper takes a step in that direction by testing the robustness of the results of 
the latter two studies above by examining different and, in our view, more realistic 
settings.' In contrast to Padmanabhan and Png (hereafter PP), we assume throughout that 
demand uncertainty is resolved after the retail price is set. PP assume that, although the 
retailer is uncertain about retail demand when ordering stocks, this uncertainty is resolved 
prior to setting the retail price.  One interpretation is that a significant period of time 
elapses between the ordering and pricing of stock by the retailer -  enough time for 
accurate retail demand information to be revealed. However, stock is often delivered 
quickly and thus the retailer has no more information when pricing than ordering. While 
this is clearly true for newspapers and magazines, demand is likely to be well known for 
such repeat purchase items anyway.  On the other hand, for novel goods (e.g., a new 
paperback novel or CD), it will be difficult for the retailer to glean information about 
demand for the product prior to it being put on the shelves (i.e., before the price is set). 
We also focus throughout on successive monopoly in manufacturing and retailing. 
We consider two different models.  The distinguishing feature of the first model is that 
the manufacturer and retailer are symmetrically uninformed about whether retail demand 
is high or low.  The second model introduces asymmetric information -  the manufacturer 
knows the actual retail demand while the retailer does not.  This is plausible for novel 
products, as the manufacturer will be better informed at the outset about product 
characteristics than the retailer. For example, a publisher, through its editors, will 
initially be better informed about the quality or appeal of a novel than a retailer who sells 
this title.  Moreover, the manufacturer has more incentive to carry out market research if 
the product constitutes a larger fraction of their sales than it does of the retailer's sales. 
In the first model we show that the retailer's profit-maximization problem has a 
solution if and only if both the level and probability of high demand are sufficiently low 
relative to the marginal costs of production and inventory storage.3 Hence, precisely the 
same conditions must hold in order for an equilibrium to exist. We conclude that under 
plausible conditions -  low marginal costs of production and storage -  the symmetric 
information model has no predictive power.  This may indicate that the model is ill suited 
to explaining returns policies.4 The result also shows that the results of PP -  who encounter no such existence problems -  are not robust to changes in the timing of 
resolution of the demand uncertainty.  While this sensitivity of the equilibrium to the 
precise informational structure is not surprising, the result commands attention simply 
because our informational structure is, in our view, more compelling than that of PP. 
We then show that if there does exist an equilibrium, it cannot involve a no-returns 
policy (i.e., zero refund). This result is essentially a by-product of the requirements for 
existence of an equilibrium -  a no-returns policy ensures that the retailer's pricing 
problem has no solution.  Second, while the model structure does not in principle 
preclude the possibility of a partial refund in equilibrium, it turns out that precisely the 
same conditions required for existence of equilibrium also rule out the possibility of a 
partial-refund.  Thus, any equilibrium involves the manufacturer offering a full-returns 
policy (i.e., a refund equal to the wholesale price). 
While other authors have also found that a full-returns policy is optimal for the 
manufacturer, our rationale differs. Neither the retailer's optimal price nor stock is a 
function of the wholesale price here.  The retail and wholesale pricing decisions are 
independent simply because the retailer commits to an amount of stock before setting the 
retail price.  The fact that the stocking decision is independent of the wholesale price is 
more surprising. The reason is that the retailer's profit is increasing and convex up to 
some threshold level of stock, while decreasing beyond this threshold. Hence, this 
threshold level is the retailer's profit-maximizing stock. We show that it is independent 
of the wholesale price and decreasing in the refund. 
Thus, in contrast to PP, the manufacturer does not offer a full-returns policy for the 
purpose of inducing the retailer to carry more stock -  that is, to mitigate the double 
marginalization problem.  From above, we know that increasing the refund actually 
exacerbates this problem. Rather, the reason for a full-returns policy is that it allows the 
manufacturer to charge a higher wholesale price.  The benefit to the manufacturer from 
charging a higher wholesale price turns out to be greater than the cost of offering the 
refund.  While Kandel offers a similar rationalization for offering a full-returns policy, the retailer's stocking level does depend on the wholesale price in his model, reflecting a 
fundamentally different equilibrium structure. 
In the second model, involving asymmetric information, we show that there is no 
equilibrium in which the manufacturer offers a full-returns policy.  This is the opposite 
result to that established in the first model, where a full-returns policy was shown to be 
the only possible equilibrium. In order to explain this result, it is easiest to distinguish 
between separating and pooling equilibria. 
It is straightforward to see why a returns policy will not be offered in a separating 
equilibrium. Clearly there is no role for a returns policy if retail demand is known 
perfectly, since in this case the retailer never carries excess stock -  they simply order to 
demand.  However, this is precisely the situation in a separating equilibrium -  the 
demand state is signaled to the retailer through the manufacturer's pricing policy, thus 
resolving the retailer's uncertainty.  While the manufacturer could offer a refund on 
returned stock, such a policy would clearly be redundant since no stock is in fact returned 
-  it is more natural to assume instead that no refund is ~ffered.~ 
In a pooling equilibrium, the structure from the retailer's perspective is identical to that 
in the symmetric information model -  in both cases they are unaware of the true demand 
and respond to a single manufacturer strategy (since both types of manufacturer choose 
the same strategy in a pooling equilibrium). Moreover, since existence of equilibrium in 
the first model rests entirely on the structure of the retailer's problem, existence of a 
pooling equilibrium is governed by exactly the same conditions as those identified in the 
first model.  One of the properties we establish in the first model is that in any 
equilibrium there is zero demand in the low demand state. In other words, the retailer 
returns their entire stock to the manufacturer when demand turns out to be low.  Clearly, 
if the refund equals the wholesale price (i.e., a full returns policy is offered) and the good 
is costly to produce, then a 'low-demand'  manufacturer incurs losses by offering a full- 
returns policy.  Thus, a full-returns policy is never offered in a pooling equilibrium. We also show that a no-returns policy cannot be offered in a pooling equilibrium. The 
intuition is identical to that in the symmetric information model -  this follows from the 
above-mentioned similarity of the structure of the retailer's strategy in a pooling 
equilibrium to that in the symmetric information model.  This result, together with the 
finding that no refunds are offered in separating equilibria, leaves pooling partial-returns 
policies as the only possible type of equilibrium refund.  We do not attempt to establish 
the conditions supporting such policies nor give a characterization of the equilibria.6 
The above results can be viewed as a comment on Kandel's intuition regarding the role 
of demand information asymmetries in explaining returns policies.  He offers two 
arguments, the first being premised on the view that, because most new products are 
market failures, the manufacturer will typically be more optimistic than the retailer about 
their product's likely success.  Thus,  the manufacturer's perceived cost of offering a 
returns policy will be lower than the retailer's perceived benefit, meaning that there can 
be mutual gains from introducing such a policy.  However, the divergent belief approach 
to modeling has been largely ignored by economists, who have instead embraced the 
asymmetric information paradigm that we adopt here.7 Kandel's second, alternative 
argument (in footnote 33), which is consistent with our approach, asserts that not offering 
a full-returns policy will signal to the retailer that demand is low.8 Thus, manufacturers 
offer a returns policy in order to dispel this belief.  While this signaling role arises in our 
model, we show that it does not guarantee that returns policies are offered in equilibrium. 
In fact, we show that they are never offered. 
In the next section we outline the symmetric information model, which we then 
analyze in section 3.  The asymmetric information model is introduced and analyzed in 
section 4, followed by concluding comments in section 5. 
2.  Model 
A manufacturer sells a good to a retailer, both being risk neutral and monopolists in 
their market?  A static (one-shot) setting is considered.  Both parties employ uniform 
prices -  that is, they don't use two-part tariffs or nonlinear pricing schedules. Retail demand is of the form q =  ai - Bp, where p is the retail price and B > 0. Both retailer and 
manufacturer are symmetrically uninformed about the true state of demand, it being 
either high or low: i  E {t,  h) ,  a, <  ah. Both parties believe that demand will be high with 
probability k  (0,l). 
The manufacturer has a constant marginal cost of production, c, but no fixed costs. 
The retailer has a constant marginal cost of inventory storage, s.  The retailer serves a 
pure distribution function, undertaking no manufacturing activities. The salvage value of 
the good is assumed to be zero for both manufacturer and retailer."  The time line is as 
follows. 
t = 1:  The manufacturer sets the wholesale price, w, and the refund, r. 
t = 2:  The retailer orders its stock, q. 
t = 3:  The retailer sets the retail price, p. 
t =  4:  Demand is realized and returns occur if necessary. 
The manufacturer is assumed to be able to commit to the returns policy that it offers. 
We solve for the subgarne perfect equilibrium in this setting. 
3.  Symmetric Information 
Each decision is analyzed in a separate subsection.  Applying backwards induction, we 
start with the last decision first. 
3.1  Retail Pricing 
Since stocks are purchased before the retailer sets its price, both the cost of the stock, 
w, and the inventory storage cost, s, are sunk at the time the retailer chooses its price - 
they are irrelevant to the determination of the retailer's optimal price, p9. However, the 
refund, r, for returned stock affects the optimal retail price since a higher refund reduces 
the pressure on the retailer to sell to consumers (i.e., supports a higher retail price). The retailer chooses p to maximize profit conditional on the level of stocks, q.  Letting 
expected demand conditional on stocks be denoted by1' 
D(P(~)  Amin{ah -8p,q)  + (l-A)min{a,-B~,qI, 
it follows that 
xr(plq)  =  D(P(~)P  + [Lmax{o,q-ah+Bp)+  (l-A)max{O,q-ae  +BPI]~. 
Since we do not know apriori  whether the optimal level of stocks will be binding in 
both the high and low demand states, only the high demand state, or in neither state, we 
need to consider these cases separately. First, suppose that stocks are never binding. 
That is, regardless of whether demand is high or low, at the chosen price there are enough 
stocks to serve the entire demand.  Since profit in this case is given by 
xr(p1q)  =  [A(ah -BPI  + (1 -A)(at  -BPI]  (P -r)  + qr, 
which is concave inp, it follows, letting 8 I  hh  + (1 -  A)ae ,  that the profit-maximizing 
price is 
Not surprisingly,p*  is positively related to the refund.  This is because the retailer's 
outside option to selling becomes more profitable as r increases, implying that a higher 
price must be paid in the market in order to make it worth selling, rather than returning, 
the good. Note also that p*  is independent of the level of stocks, q. This is because the 
retailer's decision problem at the margin remains unchanged as stocks vary -  the 
incentive to increase the retail price depends on the magnitude of the refund, not how 
much stock is on hand. 
Equation (1) defines the optimal price for any level of stocks higher than the high level 
of demand at pl, given by ah  - BPI. Thus, Equation (1) holds for all In the case where stocks are binding only in the high demand state, 
n'(p14)  =  [k  + (~-~)(a,-Bp)lp+(l-~)[9-(a,-B~)Ir~ 
Since this expression is concave inp, the function describing the profit-maximizing price 
is given by 
As stocks increases, there is an incentive to increase the price since the retailer knows it 
won't affect demand in the high demand state.  Although this exacerbates the surplus in 
the low demand state, this is being reimbursed at a fixed rate r anyway. Thus, comparing 
Equations (1) and (2), there are important differences between the retailer's pricing 
incentives when stocks are never constraining versus when they are constraining in the 
high demand state. 
An important implication of these differences is that there is no reason to expect that 
the highest level of stocks, 93, such that stocks are binding only in the high demand state 
when pricing according to Equation (2) will equal the lowest level of stocks, ql, such that 
stocks are not binding in either state when pricing atpl. This fact lies at the core of many 
of the results in this section. The solution to q3 is given by the intersection of the high 
demand function with Equation (2). That is, 
implying 
There are two possibilities: either q3 < ql or 93  2  ql.  We first show that if q3 < ql, then 
for all q E [q3,  q~]  the retailer's optimal pricing strategy has no solution. 
Lemma 1. If  r < ZilP ,  the profit-maximizing strategy of  the retailer is not well defined. 
Hence, there exists no equilibrium. We begin by noting that the inequalities q3  < ql and r < ZIP are formally equivalent. 
The non-existence of an optimal price rests on the fact that there are only two possible 
solutions: p*  is described either by $(q)  orpl. However, under the stated condition 
$(q)  is so high over the interval [q3, ql] that there is excess supply (i.e., stocks exceed 
demand) even in the high demand state.  But this violates the key premise underlying the 
optimality of $(q) -  that there is excess demand in the high demand state.  On the other 
hand, pl  cannot be the profit-maximizing price for any q E [q3, ql] because this price 
induces excess demand in the high demand state.  Again, this also violates the key 
premise underlying the optimality ofpl -  that there is always excess supply.  This 
argument is illustrated in Figure l(a) below.  Clearly, if the retailer's optimal strategy is 
not well defined then nor is the manufacturer's strategy, implying that there does not 
exist an equilibrium. 
Corollary 1.  There exists no equilibrium in which the manufacturer o_fjcers a no-returns 
policy.  That is, r*  # 0. 
This result follows straightforwardly from Lemma 1 and the fact that blB > 0. It 
remains to characterize any equilibria that do exist.  In particular, do they involve full-, 
partial-, or no-returns policies? The subsequent analysis is directed at answering this 
question.  In order to ensure that r  1  Zil B is indeed satisfied for all equilibria we 
subsequently analyze, it is necessary to check that they are consistent with the setting 
described in Figure 1  (b), not that in Figure l(a). 
In order to complete our analysis of retailer pricing, it is necessary to consider the case 
where stocks are binding in both demand states. This is true if 
Letting q2  denote the highest level of stocks such that this is true gives If92 > 0, then it is necessary to consider all q E [O, q2], in which case ad  (p;  q) = qp  . 
The following result establishes that this is not a case that we need to consider. 
Lemma 2.  Ifthere exists an equilibrium, then q2 < 0. Furthermore, demand in the low 
demand state is zero in any equilibrium. 
To conclude, if an equilibrium exists, then the retailer's optimal pricing policy is 
described by the heavy line in Figure I@). 
Figure l(a): r  < ZIP.  Figure I@): r 2 ZIP. 
3.2  Retail Stocks 
Now that we have identified the retailer's optimal pricing strategy,  p*(q), we next 
analyze their profit maximizing choice of stock, q*. We begin by imposing restrictions 
on the magnitude of the refund that the manufacturer offers. 
Assumption 1.  0 I r I w. 
We make the realistic dual assumptions that the manufacturer cannot require the 
retailer to pay in order to return stock and neither do they offer a refund that is higher 
than the wholesale price initially charged for the good.  The former assumption is 
innocuous, since a rational retailer who can freely dispose of stock will never pay the 
manufacturer for the same service. The second assumption also seems natural -  it is hard 
to imagine a manufacturer refunding more than the original sale price on a product. Note that it also rules out the possibility of a retailer arbitraging the margin when the refund is 
higher than the wholesale price, thereby making unlimited profit by ordering and 
returning an infinite amount of stock. 
We begin by establishing that over the range q 2 ql, the profit-maximizing level of 
stock is ql.  Since demand is zero in the low demand state when the price ispl (see 
Lemma 2), the retailer's profit for q 2 ql is given by 
nr(q)  =  A(ah-B~I)pl +  (A[q-ah+B~,I+(l-A)[q-a,+B~ll)r  - (w+s)q. 
Also, since 
ni  =  r - (w+s)  <  0, 
the retailer maximizes profit by choosing the lowest level of stock in the interval: q*  = ql. 
The intuition is that when q 2  ql,  the retailer returns stock in both high and low demand 
states.  Since the optimal price,pl, is independent of the level of the stock, purchasing 
more stock has no effect on the retailer's revenues from sales. Rather, it means only that 
more stock will be returned to the manufacturer.  Provided that the refund is lower than 
the sum of the wholesale price and the storage cost, which is true by virtue of 
Assumption 1, it follows immediately that the retailer maximizes profit by choosing the 
lowest level of stock in the range under consideration, ql. 
It remains only to analyze profits over the interval q~ [0, ql), in which case we know 
the retailer prices according to j(q) . Recall that stocks are constraining only in the high 
demand state in this case, while demand is always zero in the low demand state.  Thus, 
the retailer's expected profit is 
zr(q)  =  Aqj(q) + (1-A)qr  - (w+s)q. 
Also, 
z;  =  A[>(q)+$(q)ql  + (1-A)r  - (w+s), 
xiq  =  2Aj'(q)  >  0. Since the retailer's profit is convex, it is maximized at either q = 0 or q = ql. Clearly 
profit is zero at q = 0, so if ar(ql)  2 0  then we know that ql is the profit-maximizing 
level of stocks. Recalling that pl  is the profit maximizing price at ql, 
ar(ql)  =  [Ap, + (1-A)r -  w-s]ql. 
Hence, d(q1) 2 0 if and only ie2 
Since an equilibrium in which the retailer purchases no stock is not interesting, 
henceforth we assume Equation (4) to be satisfied. Thus, both the retailer's optimal 
stocking level and price are independent of the wholesale price. 
3.3  Manufacturer Pricing 
We now derive the manufacturer's optimal strategy, (w*, r*). By virtue of Lemma 2 
and the analysis above establishing that q* =  ql, the manufacturer's profit is given by 
am(w,r) =  [w-c-(1-A)r]ql.  (5) 
Since K:  (w, r)  = ql > 0,  the manufacturer should set w as high as possible. This is not 
surprising since w does not affect the manufacturer's sales, ql. However, clearly the 
retailer cannot be forced to bear negative profits, implying that the manufacturer should 
maximize w subject to satisfying d(w;  ql)  2  0.  Rearranging Equation (4) gives 
Substituting Equation (6) into Equation (5) allows us to express the manufacturer's 
profit as a function only of the refund, r. Differentiating with respect to r gives Since the manufacturer's profit is concave, assuming an interior solution, the profit 
maximizing refund solves 1C,m (r')  = 0  and is given by 
1  9 
L 
r'  =  '[a, -51  + -[s+c]  >  0. 
B  A 
The result that r' > 0  may seem unexpected, since we know that increasing the refund 
lowers the quantity that the manufacturer sells: aqlldr < 0.  The reason that the 
manufacturer prefers a positive refund is that it increases the retail price, since dplldr > 0, 
which in turn increases the retailer's profits.  This is turn allows the manufacturer to levy 
a higher wholesale price on the retailer. At low refunds, this positive effect on the 
manufacturer's profits due to increasing the refund outweighs the above negative effect. 
Our  first main result is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1.  There exists an equilibrium if and only ifthe level, ah and the 
probability, A of high demand are suflciently small relative to the marginal costs of 
production and storage, s and c, and the demand slope, B.  The unique equilibrium 
involves the retailer beingfilly refinded  for  their unsold stock 
Our  analysis can be viewed as bolstering previous findings that the manufacturer's 
optimal strategy is to fully refund returned stock.  Butz (1 997) suggests that a full-returns 
policy can be a useful, perhaps necessary, tool for inducing retailers to charge the 
manufacturer's recommended retail price.  As our retailer is a monopolist, this rationale 
is clearly not applicable to our setting. 
Kandel, whose model differs from ours in the structure of both market demand and 
uncertainty, also establishes that the manufacturer prefers full-return  contract^.'^  In his 
model, an increase in the refund has two effects on the manufacturer's profit: (i) it 
increases since a higher refund allows a higher wholesale price to be charged, and (ii) it 
decreases due to the associated increase in refunds to the retailer. Kandel shows that the 
former effect dominates the latter for any given level of stock. A similar tradeoff is 
involved here -  both (i) and (ii) come into play.  However, we observe a third effect: the 
retailer's stocking level decreases, and thus also the manufacturer's profit, as the refund 
increases. While analyzing downward sloping demand in Kandel's model is difficult, he asserts 
that a no-returns policy is optimal if the demand elasticity is sufficiently high.  Our 
analysis establishes that this is not true if the demand uncertainty is discrete rather than 
continuous -  a no-return policy is never optimal in our model.  This suggests that the 
approach to modeling demand uncertainty is not innocuous. 
PP's model (in section 6) differs from ours only in the timing of revelation of 
demand.I4 They find that a full-return policy has both benefits and costs for the 
manufacturer.  On the one hand it encourages the retailer to increase their level of stock, 
which lowers the retail price and thus mitigates the double-marginalization problem. On 
the other hand it gives the retailer an incentive to order stock with a view only to 
accommodating the high demand state, resulting in over-production by the manufacturer. 
Depending on the relative strength of these forces, either a full-return or no-return policy 
can be optimal. 
We observe precisely the opposite, as an increase in the refund increases the retail 
price and decreases the retailer's stock in our model. Not only is the structure of 
equilibrium different in the two models, but the conditions we identie as supporting a 
Ml-returns policy also differ. Moreover, PP shows that no-returns policies can occur in 
equilibrium (if ah/aC  is sufficiently high), while this is never true in our model. Thus, 
our analysis serves to put PP's  results in better perspective, since we show how 
importantly their results rely on the assumption that demand information is revealed 
before retail pricing.  As  argued earlier, there is a large class of cases for which our 
timing structure seems more plausible. 
Another important difference between our analysis and the above two analyses is that a 
complete explanation of our results is intrinsically linked to issues surrounding existence 
of equilibrium. The fact that no-returns and partial-returns policies cannot occur in 
equilibrium here is more an artifact of the equilibrium structure of our model than it is of 
the raw incentives facing the manufacturer. One striking feature of Proposition 1 is that the conditions required for existence of 
equilibrium seem unlikely to hold for many markets in which returns policies are 
observed.  That is, the marginal costs of production and storage of products such as 
books, magazines and CD's are very low.  Since it is difficult to motivate strategies if 
they cannot be shown to occur in equilibrium, it could be argued that our model is not 
appropriate for explaining returns policies in many industries.  In particular, some 
rationale other than retail demand uncertainty may be the key driver behind returns 
policies. 
4.  Asymmetric Information 
4.1  Motivation 
The model above is arguably unrealistic in assuming that the manufacturer and retailer 
are equaIZy uninformed about retail demand.  We address this deficiency in this section 
by allowing for the manufacturer to be better informed about demand than the retailer. 
This particular type of asymmetry is motivated by the view that it will typically be the 
manufacturer, rather than the retailer, who will conduct market research prior to the 
production and marketing of the good.  While the retailer will gradually learn about retail 
demand for repeat purchase goods, in the case of novel goods the manufacturer is likely 
to be better informed than the retailer at the outset. 
4.2  Model 
We make only one change to the model in section 3: the manufacturer is now assumed 
to know whether demand is high or low (as before the retailer believes that demand will 
be high with probability A).  Following the usual approach to solving Bayesian games, we 
model strategies for both the high and low demand types of manufacturer, denoting their 
strategies by (w, ,rh) and (w, ,  r, ) respectively. We extend Assumption 1 to apply to 
both types of manufacturer: r, 5 wi for i E  { t,  h) . Also, if the manufacturer is indifferent 
between two refunds, they offer only the lower refund.  Separating and pooling equilibria 
are discussed separately. 4.3  Separating Equilibrium 
We now establish that a full-returns policy cannot be offered in a separating 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 2.  In  any separating equilibrium, both types of manufacturer ofer a no- 
*  * 
returns policy.  That is, r,, = r,  = 0  . 
Note that Proposition 2 also rules out the possibility of partial refunds occurring in a 
separating equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium, by definition, the high and low 
demand manufacturers adopt different strategies.  The retailer is thus able to learn the 
true state of demand simply by observing the prices offered by the manufacturer. But a 
returns policy serves no purpose when the retailer is fully informed about demand since 
they know precisely how much stock to order in this case. Hence, a returns policy has no 
role to play in a separating equilibrium. 
It follows that if a returns policy is offered, it must be in the context of a pooling 
equilibrium. This gives us the following corollary to Proposition 2. 
Corollary 2.  Ifa returnspolicy is ofered, then both types of manufacturer ofer 
identical policies.  That is, returns policies do not serve a signaling role. 
While Kandel has proposed that a returns policy signals that a manufacturer has a high 
demand product, Corollary 2 clearly refutes this conjecture.  It might be argued that the 
strength of this result derives directly from the simplistic way in which we model the 
structure of uncertainty.  Since the retailer is perfectly informed about the specification of 
both the high and low demand schedules, in a separating equilibrium there is no residual 
uncertainty.  If instead the retailer is uncertain about the structure of both the high and 
low demand functions, then it may appear that a role remains for returns policies in a 
signaling equilibrium. However, if the uncertainty is of the same type as that modeled 
above -  the retailer believes each demand function has two (or any finite number of) 
possible intercepts -  then Corollary 2 remains true.  Instead of having two types of 
manufacturer, this simply extends the model to four types and the same intuition applies. We now turn to examine pooling equilibria in order to determine whether full-returns 
policies can arise in this setting. 
4.4  Pooling Equilibrium 
We focus here on identifying equilibria that involve either a no-returns or a full-returns 
policy.  This is sufficient to allow us to answer the question of whether incomplete 
information can motivate manufacturers to offer full-returns policies, while allowing us 
to avoid the complexities of equilibria involving partial-returns policies. 
In any pooling equilibrium (w; ,  ri  ) = (w; ,  r,')  ,  implying that the retailer learns 
nothing about the state of demand from observing the wholesale price and refund.  Thus, 
the derivation of (p*, q*) in a pooling equilibrium parallels that in section 3, implying 
that no stock is returned to the high demand manufacturer while all stock is returned to 
the low demand manufacturer in any pooling equilibrium -  see Figure I@). This gives us 
the following result. 
Proposition 3.  mere exists no pooling equilibrium in which either a  fill-returns or a no- 
returns policy is oflered 
The fact that a no-returns policy cannot be offered in a pooling equilibrium follows 
immediately from Corollary 1.  On the other hand, a full-returns policy ensures that the 
low demand manufacturer makes negative profits -  they incur positive production costs 
but make zero sales revenue (net of refunds).  A low demand manufacturer has no 
incentive to participate in such a pooling equilibrium.  Thus, if a returns policy is offered, 
it must be a partial-returns policy identical to both types of manufacturer. 
5.  Conclusion 
We have examined two different settings both of which focus on demand uncertainty - 
one in which information is symmetric, the other in which it is asymmetric.  The goal has 
been to obtain a deeper understanding of the role of demand uncertainty in 
manufacturers' returns policies.  Taken together with previous studies, our results 
indicate that while demand uncertainty alone can be sufficient to motivate returns 
policies, the precise structure of the uncertainty and the timing of its resolution critically affect the scope for, and nature of, returns policies in equilibrium. We also show that, 
contrary to previous conjecture, returns policies do not serve as a mechanism to signal to 
retailers the level of demand for the product. Moreover, full-returns policies are never 
offered in an asymmetric setting. This suggests that demand information asymmetries 
are unlikely to explain why manufacturers offer commonly observed (i.e., full-) returns 
policies. 
One obvious possible extension to our model would be to allow retailers to choose 
from among a number of products from competing manufacturers. Also, allowing for 
retail competition would clearly increase the plausibility of the model.  If in fact the true 
motivation for returns policies lies in strategic considerations due to horizontal (as 
opposed to vertical) competition, then such extensions will inevitably be required. 
Another avenue of research that has not been explored is the possibility that returns 
policies solve a moral hazard problem.  If the manufacturer forces the retailer to bear 
responsibility for unsold stock, while they benefit from not having to bear the associated 
risk, the manufacturer suffers a loss of control in the sense that they now rely on the 
retailer to voluntarily disclose sales data. This information is likely to be of value if the 
manufacturer is planning to produce similar products in the future.  Similarly, the 
information will be of strategic value to the retailer since by understating sales they are 
able to obtain stock at a lower price to reflect the (apparent) corresponding higher risk of 
having unsold stock.  Clearly, however, research along these lines requires the 
development of a dynamic model of the manufacturer-retailer relationship. References 
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Proof of Lemma 1. 
If 93 < q1, then Vqe [q3,  ql] we have p*(q) E { j(q) ,  pl ) . That is, demand either 
exceeds stocks in the high demand state, in which casep8(q) =  j(q) ,  or stocks exceed 
demand, in which casep*(q) =pl. ~u~~osep*(~)  =  j(q) . However, since j'(q) > 0,  it 
follows immediately from the definition of q3  that stocks exceed demand in the high 
demand state in this case, thus contradicting the optimality of j(q) . 
Similarly, ifpe(q) =pl,  then, since 93 < ql  w q@l; ah)  > q,Vq~  [q3,  ql], it follows that 
demand exceeds stocks in the high demand state.  Again, this contradicts the optimality 
of pl . Finally, note that 93 < q1  w  Z>  Br . 
Proof of Lemma 2. 
Lemma 1 establishes that an equilibrium exists iff r 2 Z  lB . Also, it follows from 
Equation (3) that 92  > 0 w r < a, ID.  Since, by construction, ii 2  a, ,  it follows that an 
equilibrium exists only if q2 < 0. 
To show that demand in the low demand state is zero in equilibrium, first note that 
demand is given by max{O, a, -  Bp) . There is no need to consider q < 92  since 92  < 0. 
For stocks q~ [qz, ql), the optimal price is described by j(q). Now, by definition, we 
have a, -  Bj(q2)  < 0. Since j'(q) > 0,  for all q~ (92, ql), we have a, -  Bj(q) < 0. For 
q 2 ql, we havep* =pl  .'  It is straightforward to show that pl 2 j(q,) w r 2 Z  ID, while 
Lemma 1 shows that latter to be necessary for existence of an equilibrium.  Therefore, 
again we have that a,  - Bpi < 0.  Thus, in equilibrium demand in the low demand state is 
always zero. 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Since an interior solution requires r' <  w*(r3, Equation (7) implies that the profit 
maximizing refund is given by 
r'  if  (A/2)[(2A-l)ah+2(1-A)a,]  > B(s+c), 
r*  =  ( 
w*  (r')  otherwise. 
Suppose (A /2)[(2A -  l)ah + 2(1- A)a, ]  > B(s + c) ,  so that r*  = r'.  Using Equation (7), 
existence of an equilibrium requires 
r'  2  iilB 
P(S + C)  2  (A  12)[(2~  -  i)ah + 2(1-  A)u,] 
I  At ql the retailer strictly prefers pricing at p, rather than  i,(ql) -  in both cases all stock is refunded when 
demand is low since ql<  0. That is, pricing higher doesn't diminish sales, and thus unambiguously 
increases revenues. It follows immediately that there exists no equilibrium under the presumed condition, 
thus proving the necessity of the conditions stated in the proposition. 
Suppose instead that r*  = w0(r'). Using Equations (6) and (7), existence of an 
equilibrium requires 
w*(r1)  2  ZIP 
o  42  -  sn + P )ah -  (1 -  n)(4 -A)~,]  2 -  2p[2(1- A)S  + (2 -  A)CI. 
Since ah > a,, this condition holds for all ah  and A sufficiently  small relative to s, c and 
p.  This establishes sufficiency of the stated conditions. The second statement follows 
immediately. 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
In any separating equilibrium, (wi, ri)  # (w;,  r,')  . Thus,  after observing the 
manufacturer's strategy, the retailer knows whether demand is high or low and thus 
update their prior belief accordingly: h E  (0, 1  }. For all 0 I  ri I  wi, the retailer purchases 
an amount of stock g* = [a, + /3ri]/2, all of which is sold with certainty.  Thus,  since no 
stock is ever returned, the manufacturer is indifferent between all 0 I r, I  wj.  By, 
assumption, the manufacturer chooses ri* = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
The profit of the low-demand manufacturer in a pooling equilibrium is given by 
x;(wp,rp)  =  [wp-c1q1 -191  -max{O,at  +B~lllr~. 
However, recall that any equilibrium satisfies ae -  pp, <  0. Thus, if w;  = ri  ,  then 
profit is given by 
x;(w;,r,')  =  [w;  -r;-c]gl  <  0. 
Since the low-demand manufacturer can obtain zero profit by setting w;  arbitrarily high, 
it follows immediately that there exists no pooling equilibrium satisfying w;  = r;  . 
The non-existence of a pooling equilibrium in which ri  = 0 follows immediately from 
Corollary 1. Endnotes 
See Kandel(1996) for other examples. 
Unlike Butz (1997) and others, we are not concerned here with the related issue of whether a returns 
policy serves as a substitute for vertical integration or retail price maintenance. 
If these conditions are not satisfied, there exists a range of stocking levels over which there is no profit- 
maximizing price. 
4 An alternative interpretation is that actual returns policies are rarely optimizing in the sense of being 
equilibrium strategies. 
5 This assumes that the refund is not higher than the retailer's net (wholesale price plus storage) cost of 
obtaining the stock.  This is a natural assumption -  in its absence the retailer will arbitrage the manufacturer 
and make unbounded profit while imposing unbounded losses on the manufacturer. 
6 This would greatly increase the length of the paper, while adding only modestly to the qualitative insights 
obtained. 
'  The reason for this aversion to divergent belief models is simply that they do not explain the source of the 
divergence. 
8 Although unstated, the underlying rationale here is presumably that a manufacturer with a good for which 
there is high demand will always want to offer a returns policy.  First, it induces the retailer to cany more 
stock and second it has low cost since no returns actually occur if demand is high. 
Risk neutrality ensures that our results do not rest on the insurance benefits stemming from a returns 
policy. 
lo It should be thought of as a perishable or fad good. 
This assumes that the unconditional demands satisfy ai - Bp  10. Since we show later that in equilibrium 
a, -  Bpa< 0,  strictly speaking D(p  I q)  A max{min{ah -  Bp, q},  0)  + (1 -A) max{min{a, -  Bp, q},  0)  . 
l2 We assume that the retailer chooses stock q,  if indifferent between ql  and zero. 
l3 Our model differs from Kandel in that we assume that demand is downward sloping, rather than perfectly 
elastic, and that the demand uncertainty is discrete (demand is either high or low) rather than continuous. 
Kandel briefly considers the case of downward sloping demand, but notes that closed-form solutions for the 
refund are not obtainable. He also allows for the refund to be higher than the wholesale price, and in fact 
shows the equilibrium to have this property.  We would get the same result if we relaxed Assumption 1 
since our result is a comer solution. 
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